

BUSHFIRE RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT

**FOR THE ACT BATTERY ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEM
(ACT BESS)**

BLOCK 1471

MONARO HIGHWAY,

WILLIAMSDALE, AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ITP Development (ITPD), in partnership with Macquarie New Energy Holdings Pty Ltd (GIG), is proposing to develop a large-scale grid-connected battery storage system (BESS), referred to as the ACT BESS Williamsdale project (ACT BESS), involving the construction, operation, maintenance and decommissioning of a BESS with capacity of 250 MW and associated infrastructure (the proposed development).

The ACT BESS would be located on the perimeter of Registered Rural Block 1471, District of Tuggeranong, and would connect to the Evoenergy 132 kV transmission line 97F located on the block, west of the proposed development site.

The proposed development requires approval under the ACT *Planning and Development Act 2007* (PD Act).

It is subject to a merit track Development Application (DA). Due to the nature of the development (a BESS), Umwelt has advised ITPD/GIG of the need for a bushfire risk assessment to be undertaken as part of the DA process.


Australian Bushfire Protection Planners Pty Limited has been commissioned by Umwelt, to prepare a Bushfire Risk Assessment that examines the level of existing bushfire risk in the landscape and from the risk of bushfire ignition from the (ACT BESS) and the protection measures required to mitigate the risk to the facility and the bushfire risk posed by the operation of the facility.

The examination of the bushfire risk has found that the ACT BESS site would be exposed to an extreme level of risk from a catastrophic fire event that occurs under northerly, north-westerly, westerly and south-westerly winds.

Without appropriate levels of protection, these fire events are likely to over-run the site and present a risk to the equipment and personnel.

This report has examined the minimum level of protection required to reduce the likelihood of flame contact with the equipment. However, the risk of fire over-run remains.

This report has also examined the protection of the ACT BESS from bushfires provided by the recommended widths of Asset Protection Zones to the perimeter of the Battery Storage Compound and the Substation and concludes that the provision of the bushfire protection measures will mitigate the likely threat of bushfire on the equipment.



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SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Aim of this Report.

The aim of this report is to prepare an independent bushfire risk assessment that determines the level of bushfire risk and the protection measures required to mitigate the risk to the proposed ACT BESS on Block 1471, Monaro Highway Williamsdale, ACT.

This report also investigates the potential bushfire risk created by the operation of the ACT BESS.

1.2 Objectives of the Report.

The objectives of the report are to:

- Identify the level of risk to the proposed ACT BESS in accordance with best practice bushfire risk management, Australian Standard AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 and the requirements of A.S. 3959 – 2018;
- Identify the potential for the ACT BESS to cause a bushfire in the local area;
- Identify how levels of risk can be mitigated;
- Respond to the ACT Strategic Bushfire Management Plan – 2019 – 2024;
- Provide bushfire protection measures in accordance with the ACT Bushfire Management Standards – 2023 and the ACT Bushfire Risk Mitigation General Code (2008).

The Bushfire Risk Assessment will be undertaken to assess the potential bushfire risk and identify those protection measures required to mitigate the risk.

This will include specific recommendations on fuel management, the location of Asset Protection Zones/Defendable Spaces and other measures that are deemed necessary to protect the ACT BESS equipment against the impact of a bushfire event and the measures required to mitigate the risk to the adjoining landscape from a bushfire created by the operation of the ACT BESS.

1.3 Scope of Work.

The following is an outline of the scope of work undertaken in the assessment of bushfire risk to the proposed development:

- Identify and describe the study area environment;
- Establish the context of the bushfire risk to the ACT BESS site;
- Identify measures that assist to reduce bushfire risk to the equipment;
- Identify measures required to be established to mitigate the risk from a bushfire created by the operation of the ACT BESS equipment;
- Describe the implementation of the bushfire protection measures having regard to any site constraints.

1.4 Development Proposal.

The proposed development involves the construction, operation, maintenance and decommissioning of the ACT BESS with capacity of up to 250 MW and comprises the following components:

- Standalone integrated battery and inverter stations (with combined volume equivalent to 136 x 40 foot shipping containers) and BESS transformers
- Warehouse for storage of spare parts during operation of the proposed development and for any maintenance work able to be undertaken on site;
- Electrical substation;
- One Operations building containing switchgear and BESS control equipment
- Demountable office for construction and decommissioning with carparking;
- One water tank for fire-fighting with a minimum capacity of 500,00 litres (L), and a network of fire hydrants distributed across the BESS site;
- Gravel access roads from Angle Crossing Road into the BESS and substation sites;
- An access track on the inside of the perimeter barrier/fence of the BESS and substation sites for fire-fighting operations, located within the asset protection zones for fire protection and management. The APZs are located within the development site assessed in the Development Application;

The BESS and substation sites would be located within a compound with a perimeter barrier or 3 metre high chain-wire fence. The height and type of the barrier/fence would be determined during detailed design in accordance with noise, bushfire and electrical requirements.

The substation would be located in the north-western corner of the development site with aerial connection to the existing Evoenergy 132 kV Transmission Line 97F located on the block, west of the development site.

33 kV cabling would connect the BESS facility to the substation.

A construction and laydown area has been set aside to the south of the BESS site. This would be enclosed by temporary fencing during construction and rehabilitation.

Figure 1 – Proposed development Site – Source Umwelt.





Figure 2 – Site Layout Plan – Source Umwelt.



SECTION 2 DESCRIPTION OF THE BUSHFIRE RISK STUDY AREA

2.1 Bushfire Risk Study Area.

For the purpose of examining the potential bushfire risk to the proposed development site a study area has been established. Figure 4 provides a graphical representation of the ACT BESS study area examined in this report.

Figure 4 – Bushfire Risk Study Area.



2.2 Site Assessment.

A desk-top review of the proposed development site and surrounding development was completed for the preparation of this report. The author had previously inspected the site in the preparation of the Bushfire Report for the Williamsdale Substation and the Williamsdale Solar Farm.

The ACT Territory Plan, Bushfire Prone Land Map, Strategic Bushfire Management Plan (BFMP); Bushfire Operations Plan (BOP); Aerial Photography, Contour and Vegetation Maps were reviewed.

2.3 Existing Land Use.

The proposed development site contains vacant grazing land.

2.4 Adjoining Land Use.

The proposed development site is bounded by Angle Crossing Road to the north, the Monaro Highway to the east and the existing Evoenergy 132 kV Transmission Line 97K easement to the west.

Vacant grazing land within Block 1471 is located to the south of the proposed development site.

2.5 Bushfire Prone Areas.

The Strategic Bushfire Management Plan Version 2 was published by the ACT Government in October 2009 and defined and mapped bushfire zones.

The Strategic Bushfire Management Plan Version 3 was published by the ACT Government in September 2014 and identified bushfire prone areas.

The BPA map is a single risk-based map that defines the area of the ACT that has been assessed as being at high risk to life and property due to bushfires.

Figure 5 provides an extract from the ACT Bushfire Prone Areas Map which identifies the ACT BESS site and adjoining land as containing bushfire prone vegetation.

Figure 5 – Extract from the ACT Bushfire Prone Land Map



2.6 ACT Bushfire Operations Plan (BOP).

The Strategic Bushfire Management Plan Version 3 developed and reviewed Bushfire Operational Plans (BOPs) for key areas of the Territory for government and non-government lands.

A Bushfire Operational Plan details the specific bushfire mitigation activities to be undertaken by a landholder to reduce the risk of bushfire spreading into the urban area.

Figure 6 provides an extract from the ACT Bushfire Operations Plan (BOP) Land Map which identifies the land in the vicinity of the proposed development site which is managed by the Territory.

Figure 6 – Extract from the ACT Bushfire Operations Plan (BOP).




The maintenance of the areas identified in the BOP provides no meaningful bushfire risk mitigating benefit to the ACT BESS site.

2.7 Topography.

The land within the proposed development site falls from the northwest corner 19 metre (3 degrees) towards the dam. The land falls from the northeast corner 8 metres (3 degrees) towards the dam, centrally located to the south of the proposed development site.

Figure 7 – Contour Plan – Source Umwelt.



The land to the south of the proposed development site continues to fall to the south and southwest at less than 5 degrees. The land to the west of the proposed development site falls to the west at 85 degrees towards the Murrumbidgee River corridor.

The land to the north of the proposed development site falls to the northeast, north and northwest across the Williamsdale Solar Farm at less than 5 degrees.

Figure 8 – Topographic Plan – SixMaps



Contour Interval: 5m

2.8 Vegetation within the Proposed Development Site.

Figure 9 provides the Vegetation Mapping supplied by Umwelt, identifying that proposed development site contains exotic grassland and woodland vegetation.

2.9 Vegetation on land adjoining the Proposed Development Site.

Figure 9 provides a copy of the ACTMapi vegetation map for the area surrounding the proposed development site, identifying a mixture of exotic grassland and areas of Blakely's Red Gum Yellow Box tall grassy woodland on the land to the south of the proposed development site.

Similar vegetation communities extend to the west, forming into Blakely's Red Gum Yellow Box tall grassy woodland further to the west.

The vegetation on the land to the north of the development site consists of managed grassland vegetation within the Solar Farm.

The land surrounding the Solar Farm site contains exotic grassland and woodland vegetation.

Figure 9 – Vegetation Map – Source Umwelt.



- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>ACT16.1.4 Box gum woodland with low quality native understorey and no canopy regeneration</p> <p>ACT16.3.4 Box gum woodland with sparse canopy and no regeneration, and exotic-dominated understorey</p> | <p>ACT16.2.4 Box gum woodland with sparse canopy and no regeneration, and low quality native understorey</p> <p>ACT16.4.4 Exotic grassland</p> <p>Waterbody</p> |
|---|---|

Figure 10 – ACTMapi Vegetation Map.



2.10 Ecological Constraints.

ACTMapi does not record any threatened species within the proposed development site.

Umwelt has undertaken ecological surveys across the development site and has identified 0.21 ha of potential low-quality pink-tailed worm-lizard habitat within the site, as well as mature trees that constitute potential foraging and breeding habitat for threatened bird species.

Additionally, 0.15 ha of the threatened box gum woodland ecological community occurs in the development site.

Figure 11 – Pink-tailed Worm Lizard (*Aprasia parapulchella*) Habitat Map – Source Umwelt.




Figure 12 – Mature Trees – Source Umwelt.





Figure 13 – Threatened Ecological Communities – Source Umwelt.



SECTION 3

BUSHFIRE RISK ASSESSMENT – ACT BATTERY ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEM (ACT BESS) – BLOCK 1471 MONARO HIGHWAY, WILLIAMSDALE, ACT.

3.1 Introduction.

The Australian Standard AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 and the Emergency Management Australia (EMA) emergency risk management process provide the framework for establishing the context, analysis, evaluation, treatment, monitoring and communication of risk.

Risk has two elements: likelihood, the chances of a bushfire occurring and consequence, the impact of a bushfire when it occurs.

Bushfire risk is defined as the chance of a bushfire occurring that will have harmful consequences to human communities and the environment. Bushfire risk is usually assessed through consideration of the likelihood of ignition and consequences of a bushfire occurring. Risk reduction can be achieved by reducing the likelihood of a bushfire, the opportunity for a bushfire to spread or the consequence of a bushfire (on natural and built assets).

Bushfire management should have a clear objective to reduce both the likelihood of bushfires and reduce the negative impacts of bushfires. It should also consider the costs, inconvenience and dangers of measures taken to reduce the risk of bushfires.

The consequences of bushfire management activities and the failure to implement programs also need to be considered. A range of factors influence bushfire risk – these include:

- The likelihood of human and natural fire ignitions, as influenced by time, space and demographics;
- The potential spread and severity of a bushfire, as determined by fuel, topography and weather conditions;
- The proximity of assets vulnerable to bushfire fuels, and likely bushfire paths; and
- The vulnerability of assets including natural assets, or their capacity to cope with, and recover from bushfire.

3.2 Risk Assessment.

An assessment of bushfire risk must firstly define the problem.

This involves the identification of the nature and scope of issues to be addressed and defining the possible boundaries for the assessment (*Emergency Risk Management – Applications Guide*. (EMA Echo Press, 2000), and AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009).

For the purpose of analysing fire risks that might emerge in the ACT, a dangerous and damaging fire has the potential to occur when the following conditions prevail:

- Continuous available fuel – fuel at moisture content sufficiently low to enable rapid combustion, arising from drought effects or the maturing and drying, of grasslands;
- Exposure of vulnerable assets. The ‘catchment’ for such fires may be within several hundred metres or many (60-70) kilometres from the asset/s;
- A combination of weather conditions that generate a forest or grass fire danger index of Very High or greater. Typically, in the ACT, prevailing adverse fire weather will have a strong northerly, through to south-westerly wind influence;
- A fire in the landscape which is not effectively suppressed.

The assessment of the risk to the proposed development site was undertaken during the site investigation and identified that the BESS and Substation sites will be exposed to the risk of northerly, north-westerly, westerly, south-westerly and south-easterly fire paths.

The fire path from the northwest has the potential to rapidly travel across the landscape, crossing the Murrumbidgee River corridor and spreading upslope towards the Solar Farm and proposed development site.

A similar potential exists for a fire event to spread across the landscape under westerly and south-westerly winds, upslope from the Murrumbidgee River corridor. A southerly, south-easterly, easterly and north-easterly wind driven fire event is also likely to impact on the BESS site.

The site investigation has determined that the bushfire risk to the BESS and Substations sites from the north, northwest, west and southwest is extreme with fire likely to over-run the site.

The bushfire risk to the BESS site from the south, east and northeast is high with fire likely to impact the outer areas of the BESS and Substation site.

Figure 14 – Plan of potential Northwest, Northeast and Southwest fire paths.




Figure 15 – Plan of potential Southeast and West fire paths.



SECTION 4

BUSHFIRE PROTECTION ASSESSMENT – TERRITORY BATTERY ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEM (ACT BESS) – BLOCK 1471 MONARO HIGHWAY, WILLIAMSDALE, ACT.

4.1 Introduction

Section 8.3.4 of the ACT Bushfire Management Standards 2023 identifies the following bushfire protection measures for Wind, Solar Farms and Battery Energy Storage Systems:

8.3.4 Wind, solar farms, and Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS)

Wind, solar farms, and BESS require special consideration and must be provided with adequate clearances to combustible vegetation as well as firefighting access and water. These types of developments will require engagement with ESA on a case-by-case basis before support can be given. Please contact ESA for further information.

The following must be provided for wind, solar farms and BESS:

- *a minimum 20m APZ for the structures and associated buildings/infrastructure; and*
- *the APZ must be maintained to the standard of an IAPZ for the life of the development.*

Infrastructure for the purposes of requiring APZ excludes:

- *road access to the site; and*
- *power or other services to the site and associated fencing.*

Essential equipment must be designed and housed in such a way as to minimise the impact of bush fires on the capabilities of the infrastructure during bush fire emergencies. It should also be designed and maintained so that it will not serve as a bush fire risk to surrounding bush.

Where infrastructure is considered 'critical' e.g., loss of infrastructure resulting in community unable to function, the most vulnerable component of each part of a facility, critical to its continued functioning in a bushfire, is to be identified, and the Radiant Heat Flux (RHF) that each will fail at identified.

APZs are to be provided to ensure the failure RHF for the critical component(s) are not exceeded, if an APZ of sufficient size is not possible, then the critical component(s) are required to be shielded and the effectiveness of the shielding is to be appropriately demonstrated.

A Bush Fire Emergency Management and Operations Plan must identify all relevant risks and mitigation measures associated with the construction and operation of the wind, solar farm, or BESS. This should include:

- *detailed measures to prevent or mitigate fires igniting.*
- *work that should not be carried out during total fire bans.*
- *availability of fire-suppression equipment, access, and water.*
- *storage and maintenance of fuels and other flammable materials.*
- *notification to ACT ESA for any works that have the potential to ignite surrounding vegetation, proposed to be carried out during a bushfire danger period to ensure weather conditions are appropriate; and*
- *appropriate bush fire emergency management planning.*

It is important to be aware of operations that may be carried out on days of Total Fire Ban and any prohibited activities or exemptions that are notified under the Emergencies Act 2004.

4.2 Provision of Asset Protection Zones to ACT BESS and Substation.

The location of the Solar Farm to the north of the ACT BESS removes the potential bushfire risk to the ACT BESS.

Proposed development includes the provision of a 20 metre wide Inner Asset Protection Zone to the east, south and west of the Battery Storage Cabinets and equipment in the Substation.


This satisfies the requirements of the ACT Bushfire Management Standards.

The 20 metre wide Asset Protection Zone also mitigates the risk of flame contact and high levels of radiant heat flux on the Battery Storage Cabinets and associated equipment from predominantly grassland fires.

The maintenance of the Power Line Easement to the west of the Substation, the management of Angle Crossing Road and the provision of a 20 metre wide Asset Protection Zone to the north, east and south of the Substation equipment mitigates the risk of flame contact and high levels of radiant heat flux from a north-westerly, westerly and south-westerly wind driven bushfire.

Asset Protection Zones to the proposed development shall be maintained to the standards required by Appendix 4 and Appendix 5 of the ACT Bushfire Management Standards 2023.

Figure 16 – Plan of the recommended Asset Protection Zones to the ACT BESS and Substation.



4.3 Provision of Protection Measures to mitigate the risk of fire escape from the site during construction or operations.

The provision of the recommended Asset Protection Zone to the ACT BESS and Substation will not prevent electrical fires that occur in the ACT BESS or Substation spreading into grassland vegetation on the adjoining land.

Grassland/crop fires produce fast moving, hot fires that give off burning embers that can travel kilometres ahead of the fire front. The spotting distance depends on wind speed.

A catastrophic grassland fire event has the potential to 'out-run' fire-fighting efforts with reliance mainly being on aerial water bombing being the safest method of control.

The construction of the proposed ACT BESS and Substation will increase the responsibility on the adjoining landowners/Managers to manage their land to mitigate the risk of fire spread.

It is therefore recommended that co-operation with the adjoining Owner/ Leasee be sought to ensure the grassland vegetation is managed to a maximum height of 200mm during the prescribed Bushfire Danger Period.

Any management agreement with the current or future Leasee of the adjoining land should include a clause that establishes the continuing need for the management of the vegetation to reduce the fuel hazard

4.4 Provision of Bushfire Mitigation Measures other than Defendable Space setbacks to the equipment.

The provision of gravel as the ground cover around the Battery Storage Cabinets and Transformers and electrical equipment in the Substation compound would reduce the risk of ignition within the Battery Storage and Substation compounds from embers.

Exposed cables should be shielded with a non-combustible collar to a height of 400mm above ground or pavement level.

The installation of 'knock-down' fire extinguishment equipment such as CO₂ or Dry Chemical dousing system should be considered to mitigate the risk of cabinet to cabinet fire spread.

4.5 Access for Fire-fighting Operations.

All access roads shall provide satisfactory access for ACT Fire & Rescue and ACT Rural Fire Service Appliances.

The minimum width of the access roads off Angle Crossing Road to the battery storage compound shall be 6.0 metres. Minimum vertical clearance shall be 4.0 metres.

An access road shall be provided to the entire perimeter of the Battery Storage compound and to the east and south of the Substation compound as shown on the Concept Plan.

The minimum width of the perimeter access road should be 6.0 metres within the Asset Protection Zone. Corners should be designed to provide an inner radius of minimum 6.0 metres and an outer radius of 12 metres.

A layby parking bay shall be provided adjacent to the Static Water Supply Tank.

The access roads should be designed and constructed to provide a carrying capacity of 23 tonnes GVM for fire-fighting appliances.

Gates shall have a minimum opening width of 3.6 metres.

4.6 Water Supplies for Fire Fighting Operations.

The BESS site is not connected to a reticulated mains water supply.

The proposed development provides for the installation of a minimum 500kl static water supply tank and Booster Assembly, located at the entry to the BESS.

A layby parking for fire appliances will be provided adjacent to the tank. The proposed development also includes the installation of a ring main from the tank, complete with Hydrants, installed in accordance with AS 2419.1:2021.

The tank shall be maintained full and resupplied immediately after use.

The water supply has been designed in accordance with the CFA's *'Design Guidelines and Model Requirements for Renewable Energy Facilities'*.

4.7 Occupation of the BESS during Total Fire Ban Days.

The BESS and Substation should not be occupied on Total Fire Ban Days.

No 'hot works' should be undertaken on Total Fire Ban Days.

If emergency work is required to be undertaken during extreme/catastrophic fire danger weather personnel should be accompanied by the ACT Rural Fire Service.

4.8 Fire protection measures required for Construction and Decommissioning works.

The use of heavy earthmoving equipment and works that include grinding/welding shall not take place during declared Total Fire Ban days. The bushfire risk to personnel and equipment will remain during the construction and decommissioning works.

It is recommended that once the detail design is completed the head contractor shall include the management of bushfire risk in the Construction Environment Management Plan (CEMP), Decommissioning Plan (DP), Evacuation Plan (EP) and Operations Environment Management Plan (OEMP).

It is also recommended that, during the construction and decommissioning works periods, the contractor shall provide a suitable fire response Tanker Trailer and portable fire extinguishers.

If emergency work is required to be undertaken during extreme/catastrophic fire danger weather personnel should be accompanied by the ACT Rural Fire Service.

4.9 Bushfire Operations Plan (BOP).

Once detailed design is complete the operator of the facility shall prepare and submit to the ESA a Bushfire Operations Plan for the site.

The BOP shall include:

- *detailed measures to prevent or mitigate fires igniting.*
- *work that should not be carried out during total fire bans.*
- *availability of fire-suppression equipment, access, and water.*
- *storage and maintenance of fuels and other flammable materials.*
- *notification to ACT ESA for any works that have the potential to ignite surrounding vegetation, proposed to be carried out during a bushfire danger period to ensure weather conditions are appropriate; and*

The BOP must detail the specific timing, type and location of fuel-reduction and access and infrastructure activities proposed to be taken and will be prepared and implemented as part of the CEMP and OEMP.

4.10 Bushfire Emergency Evacuation Plan (BEEP).

The operator of the facility shall prepare and submit to the ESA a Bushfire Emergency Evacuation Plan (BEEP) for the site.

The BEEP will identify appropriate procedures for occupants to follow in the event of a bushfire and it to contain the following minimum requirements:

- ❖ Name and address of facility;
- ❖ Contact details (including phone number);
- ❖ Number of employees/occupants;
- ❖ Primary Action (evacuate or shelter)

- ❖ Details of location or address of Primary Action;
- ❖ Details of location or address of back-up/pre-emptive procedures;
- ❖ Procedure for Primary Action and back-up actions;

- ❖ Assembly point(s) and transportation arrangements (evacuation only);

- ❖ Action statements before, during and after a bushfire);

- ❖ Site layout of the facility;

- ❖ Attachments including occupant/employee listing.

SECTION 5

CONCLUSION – TERRITORY BATTERY ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEM (ACT BESS) – BLOCK 1471 MONARO HIGHWAY, WILLIAMSDALE, ACT.

The location of the ACT BESS and Substation exposes the site to the impact of a fast-moving bushfire burning upslope from the northwest, west and southwest from the Murrumbidgee River. The site is also exposed to north-easterly and southerly/south-east fire paths.

The northwest, west and southwest fire paths will expose the site is an extreme level of risk, including direct flame contact and fire over-run.

This report examines the protection to the ACT BESS that is provided by the existing Solar Farm, located to the north of Angle Crossing Road and provides an assessment of bushfire risk and considers the impact of bushfire on the proposed development and provides advice on the establishment of Asset Protection Zones to the perimeter of the ACT BESS and Substation site.

This report provides recommendations on the management of the grassland on the adjoining land and the provision of fire-fighting access for emergency vehicles and personnel, water supplies for fire-fighting operations and recommends measures to mitigate the risk of bushfire impact on and fire events from the facility during construction and decommissioning stages.

It also incorporates the bushfire protection measures required to satisfy the ACT Bushfire Management Standards 2023.



Graham Swain
Managing Director
Australian Bushfire Protection Planners Pty Limited.

Fire Protection Association Member No: 48781

REFERENCES:

- ACT Strategic Bushfire Management Plan – Version 3 – 2014;
- ACT Strategic Bushfire Management Plan – 2019 - 2024;
- ACT Bushfire Management Standards 2023;
- Planning for Bushfire Risk Mitigation General Code – 2009;
- The Canberra Spatial Plan – ACT Planning & Land Authority – March 2004;
- *Australian Standard for Risk Management A.S./N.Z.S. ISO 31000:2009 and A.S. 3959 - 2018;*
- Emergency Risk Management – Applications Guide. (EMA) 2000);
- Overall Fuel Hazard Guide Fourth Edition – DSE. July 2010.